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ABSTRACT 
Digital piracy has been shown to be an emerging societal problem. However, research has 
demonstrated limited techniques that effectively combat digital piracy. The purpose of the 
present study is to examine the utility of computer viruses in deterring digital piracy. The findings 
from responses to a survey of college students revealed that fear of computer viruses may 
influence respondents’ intentions to engage in digital piracy. The policy implications of this 
finding are discussed. 
  
The widespread use of personal computers has created new opportunities for criminal 
activity. One of the most pervasive forms of computer crime is digital piracy (Gopal, 
Sanders, Bhattacharjee, Agrawal, & Wagner, 2004). Digital piracy is defined as the illegal 
act of copying digital goods, software, digital documents, digital audio (including music 
and voice), and digital video for any reason other than to back up without explicit permission 
from and compensation to the copyright holder (Gopal et al., 2004; Higgins, Fell, & 
Wilson, 2006). The Internet has facilitated an increase in digital piracy in recent years. Wall 
(2005) notes four characteristics of the Internet that have enabled individuals to easily 
commit criminal activity: It allows anonymous communication, it is transnational, it has 
created a shift in thinking from the ownership of physical property to the ownership of 
ideas, and it is relatively easy. Additionally, Wall (2005) contends that the Internet facilitates 
piracy because it allows the offense to take place detached from the copyright holder, 
which provides the offender with the perception that the act is victimless. 
 
Several researchers have acknowledged subforms of digital piracy (i.e., audio and video 
piracy) as being increasingly pervasive (Gopal et al., 2004; Hinduja, 2003). Higgins et al. 
(2006) defined audio and video piracy as the “illegal act of uploading or downloading digital 
sound or video without explicit permission from and compensation to the copyright 
holder” (p. 4). Technological advancements are partly responsible for the increased ease 
and accessibility of digital piracy. The International Federation of Phonographic Industries 
(IFPI, 2006) estimates that one in three music discs purchased around the world is an illegal 
copy. The IFPI further estimates that 37% of all CDs purchased in 2005 were pirated, 
resulting in 1.2 billion illegal copies purchased worldwide. In fact, the IFPI concludes that 
pirate CD sales outnumbered legitimate CD sales in 30 markets across the world and 
resulted in a loss of $4.5 billion from the music industry. 
 
Digital piracy is a criminal act (Higgins et al., 2006). Mass copyright violations of 
movies and music were made a felony offense in 1982 by The Piracy and Counterfeiting 
Amendments Act. Additionally, distribution of copyrighted materials over the Internet was 
made a felony offense by The No Electronic Theft Act (Koen & Im, 1997). To date, little 
research has examined from a criminological perspective the factors that may reduce 
instances of digital piracy and the individual propensities that attract individuals to digital 
piracy. Only one study, Higgins et al. (2006), has examined both of these factors within the 
same study. 
 
Using criminological theory to examine digital piracy is important for two reasons. First, 
criminological theories allow researchers to organize their empirical data in a rational way. 
Second, criminological theories provide researchers with potential information for developing 
policies that can help to reduce instances of digital piracy. Thus, deterrence and selfcontrol 
theories are attractive because they both focus on the decision-making process for 
digital piracy. Furthermore, these two theories provide a distinct understanding of the factors 
that can be used to reduce the instances of digital piracy. In addition, this study uses 
viruses as an additional deterrent factor that can provide an advance to deterrence theory. 
This study is important because it will identify the individual propensity (i.e., low selfcontrol) 
that may reduce an individual’s ability to see the inhibiting factors of engaging in 
digital piracy. Furthermore, it will identify the factors that may reduce the instances of digital 
piracy. The study begins by outlining deterrence theory and its application to digital 
piracy through the empirical literature. Next, the study presents low self-control and its 
relation to digital piracy as seen in the empirical literature. The methods and results follow. 
The study ends with a discussion that outlines policy implications. 
 
DETERRENCE 
 
The criminal justice system has traditionally relied on deterrence theory to combat crime 
in the United States. To gain compliance to the law, the criminal justice system seeks out 
individuals who perform criminal actions and applies punishment to these acts (Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). The threat of punishment keeps individuals from committing crimes. These 
forms of deterrence come in two types—specific and general. Specific deterrence occurs 
when punishment for the commission of an offense prevents or deters the individual from 
committing the same offense in the future because of fear of further ramifications. General 
deterrence occurs when individuals not engaging in criminal behavior witness the penalties 
incurred by another individual that has committed a criminal offense. These people are 
deterred from committing the particular criminal offense out of fear of receiving the same 
punishment as the individual that committed the act. 
 
There are two forms of deterrence theory—classical and contemporary. Under classical 
deterrence theory, humans are assumed to be rational actors. In other words, individuals 
will elect to perform behaviors that are more pleasurable or beneficial to them than those 
that are painful or costly. Three factors determine whether an individual will be deterred 
from committing a criminal act. The certainty (i.e., the individual’s belief that the act will 
be detected), severity (i.e., the individual’s belief that the act will be punished severely), and 
swiftness (i.e., the individual’s belief that the act will be detected quickly) must all be high. 
According to classical deterrence theory, the cost or pain associated with the commission 
of a criminal act is increased when the threat of detection and punishment are certain, 
severe, and swift. 
 
The literature has not completely supported the contentions made by classical deterrence 
theory. Most important, the empirical research has consistently shown that the threat 
of certainty is more important than severity (Paternoster, 1987; Yu & Liska, 1993). These 
findings were discovered through meta-analyses of perceptual research that utilized scenarios 
of criminal activities. Other researchers have found results that support those of 
these meta-analyses (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; 
Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Pogarsky, 2002). Because there has not been full support for 
all concepts of classical deterrence theory, a modern version of the theory has emerged to 
repair the problems. 
 
Contemporary deterrence theory modified classical deterrence theory by incorporating 
inhibition and motivation measures for crime. Inclusion of measures such as shame, guilt, 
and embarrassment were suggested by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) to fully understand 
how individuals may be deterred from committing criminal acts. Research has shown guilt 
to be an effective measure that reduces the likelihood of criminal behavior (Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2003, 2004; Pogarsky, 2002, 2004). According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), 
guilt is a self-stigmatizing measure that acts as an inhibitor to criminal behavior. 
An individual’s moralistic view of behavior has been considered as an inhibiting factor 
for deterrence theory as well. Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) argued that a belief 
will act as an inhibiting factor if an individual believes a behavior to be morally wrong. A 
review of the deterrence literature yields strong support for this contention and shows that 
moral beliefs are an important factor in the decision-making process of individuals 
(Paternoster, 1987; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Pogarsky 
2002, 2004; Tibbetts, 1997). Research of software piracy has shown that individuals are 
more likely to engage in this behavior when they believe it to be moral as opposed to 
immoral (Higgins, 2005; Wagner & Sanders, 2001). A meta-analysis of software piracy 
found that a person’s moral beliefs and attitudes impact his or her likelihood of engaging 
in illegal piracy on the computer (Liang & Yan, 2005). 
 
Social disapproval has been argued to be an important inhibiting factor for criminal 
behavior (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Grasmick and Bursik suggested that the possibility 
of friends and family discovering criminal behavior would function as a form of punishment 
that could vary in both certainty and severity. The actor could become embarrassed if 
those that he or she admires, trusts, or is close to become aware of participation in a criminal 
act. Pogarsky (2002) showed that this contention is correct and that when an individual 
anticipates this form of discovery and embarrassment, he or she is more likely to be 
inhibited or deterred from performing the criminal act. Research on software piracy has 
shown that family disapproval has a significant impact on deterring the behavior by creating 
a social stigma that, in turn, produced greater inhibitions. 
Deterrence literature has also examined the role of previous behavior on future behavior. 
Research has shown that individuals who had performed a behavior in the past were more likely 
to engage in the behavior in the future (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991). The researchers concluded 
that this occurred as a result of past behavior reducing inhibitions on future behavior. 
Other researchers have found similar findings (Cochran, Wood, Sellers, Wilkerson, & 
Chamlin, 1998; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003, 2004; Paternoster, 1986; Paternoster & Piquero, 
1995). Past software piracy has also been shown to predict future software piracy (Higgins 
& Makin, 2004a, 2004b; Higgins, Wilson, & Fell, 2005). 
 
Low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) has been shown to be a contributing factor 
in the commission of criminal behavior. Gottfredson and Hirschi define low selfcontrol 
as the inability of an individual to resist a temptation toward criminal behavior 
when an opportunity for it exists. An individual with low self-control prefers behaviors that 
are risky, impulsive, easy, nonempathetic, and immediately gratifying (Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990). Criminological research has supported the contention that low self-control 
can lead to criminal behavior (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; 
Tibbetts, 1997; Tibbetts & Myers, 1999). Several studies have shown that low self-control 
is especially useful in predicting software piracy (Higgins, 2005; Higgins & Makin, 2004a, 
2004b; Higgins et al., 2005). Accordingly, this theoretical orientation should be taken into 
account when examining digital piracy from a deterrence perspective. 
 
Social learning theory (Akers, 1998; Sutherland, 1947) has been shown to be a viable 
contributor to deterrence research. Specifically, Akers (1998) showed that criminal or deviant 
peer associations increased an individual’s likelihood of engaging in criminal behavior. 
This perspective has been examined by deterrence researchers, who found that there is a 
connection between peer association and intention to drink (Pogarsky, 2002). Peer associations 
have also been shown to be useful predictors of software piracy (Christensen & 
Eining, 1991; Higgins & Makin, 2004b; Skinner & Fream, 1997). 
 
Sherizen (1995) examined whether or not computer crime can be deterred and concluded 
that there is a great need for criminologists to examine this behavior using a deterrence 
perspective.  Although researchers have studied the applicability of deterrence theory in 
explaining software piracy (Gopal & Sanders, 1997; Higgins & Makin, 2004a, 2004b; 
Higgins et al., 2005; Peace, Galletta, & Thong, 2003), very little deterrence research has 
examined music piracy. Several researchers that did examine similar topics found that 
magnitude of consequence and peer perceptions were important variables influencing an 
individual’s decision to pirate music (Chiou, Huang, & Lee, 2005; d’Astous, Colbert, & 
Montpetit, 2005). Additional researchers have found that stricter regulations on how music 
is sold and shared over the Internet would reduce the incidence of music piracy (Easley, 
Michel, & Devaraj, 2003; Fivelsdal, 2005; Wade, 2004). 
 
The growth in computer use has ushered increased concerns of computer viruses 
throughout the world (Balthrop, Forrest, Newman, & Williamson, 2004). “The term virus 
refers to malicious software that requires help from computer users to spread to other 
computers” (Balthrop et al., 2004, p. 527). Computer viruses can halt essential operations in 
business, disrupt banking transactions, delay airline flights, and bring down emergency call 
centers (Balthrop et al.). Although antivirus software is available to computer users, it has 
been shown that “viruses can spread even when infection probabilities are vanishingly 
small” (Lloyd & May, 2001, p. 1316). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that “current 
antivirus and network intrusion detection solutions can become overwhelmed by the burden 
of capturing and classifying new viral strains and intrusion patterns” (Harmer, 
Williams, Gunsch, & Lamont, 2002, p. 252). Although such viruses as “Sobig” have caused 
more than $30 billion in damage across the world (Balthrop et al.), the threat to personal 
computer users is real and potentially devastating (Balthrop et al.; Harmer et al., 2002; 
Lloyd & May, 2001). In 2002, it was estimated that there were more than 55,000 different 
computer virus strains identified (Harmer et al., 2002). 
 
The threat of computer virus infection is omnipresent and potentially unavoidable to users 
of systems such as music file sharing networks (Balthrop et al., 2004; Harmer et al., 2002; 
Lloyd & May, 2001). According to reports by the IFPI (2006), individuals who participate in 
music piracy have fears of contracting a computer virus as a result of the behavior. Most 
important, it was shown by research analysts “Jupiter” that 35% of a sample had stopped or 
reduced their music piracy as a direct result of the effects of viruses on computers (IFPI, 
2006). This suggests that the threat and potential consequences of viruses deterred individuals 
in this sample from participating in music piracy. Despite the availability of antivirus software, 
some music pirates still perceive the risk of computer viruses to be greater than the 
rewards of the behavior. Additionally, the results suggest that viruses exhibited a certain, 
severe, and swift consequence of engaging in music piracy that was great enough to deter 
some individuals. The present study expects to find similar results. Specifically, those 
individuals that list computer viruses as a potential consequence of engaging in music piracy will 
be less likely to have intentions to pirate music. The present study is the first known analysis 
with the purpose of investigating the applicability of deterrence theory on music piracy. 
Specifically, it is the first study to explicitly examine the deterrent impact of computer viruses 
on music piracy involvement and behavior. Thus, a gap will be filled in the criminological 
literature concerning digital piracy. This compelling study will go beyond software piracy 
literature by examining the role of deterrence theory and computer viruses in music piracy. 
 
 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
The purpose of the present study is to examine the roles of deterrence theory, peer 
associations, and self-control theory in the context of music piracy. Specifically, this study 
explores the utility of computer viruses as a deterrent to music piracy. Going beyond 
Higgins et al. (2006), we expect that contemporary deterrent factors and viruses will have 
a deterrent effect on digital piracy. The present study adds to the current literature on 
deterrence theory and expands on it by integrating new deterrent possibilities. Besides 
important contributions to academia, the present study has provided policy implications for law 
 
enforcement, Internet service providers, and college administrators that can be utilized to 
combat future music piracy. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Procedures and Sampling 
 
This study used a self-report questionnaire administered to college students at several 
universities in the southeastern United States. On Institutional Review Board and Human 
Subject Protection review, data were collected during the 2006 fall semester. The survey 
was handed out to required general education courses open to all majors and courses only 
open to justice administration majors. Professors of the surveyed classes had given prior 
permission for the study to take place during class. Students present in class on the day that 
the questionnaire was administered took part in the study. A cover sheet on the front of the 
survey explained the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of the study, and that 
response would be completely anonymous and confidential. The researchers also verbally 
stressed these rights to the students as the survey was being handed out. Following these 
procedures, approximately 400 surveys were collected as part of the sample. Table 1 presents 
the demographic profile of the sample broken down by sex, race, age, major, and 
income level. The median age of the sample was 21 years, with a range from 18 to over 25; 
39.9% of the sample was male (n = 143) and 59.2% were female (n = 212); 28.2% of 
respondents were non-White (n = 101), and the remaining 66.2% were White (n = 237). 
 
 
 
 
The present study uses a nonrandom sample that can be criticized for lack of generalizability. 
However, the two theories in question, deterrence and self-control, are considered 
general theories because they attempt to explain all crime all of the time, no matter the 
sample. Consequently, a nonrandom sample can be utilized to generalize about a larger 
population (Love, 2006). 
 
Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, and Paternoster (2004) have criticized researchers for using samples 
of college students in analyses of deterrence theory, arguing that students may not be 
likely to engage in the types of criminal behaviors that are being studied. However, the 
research shows that college students, as a group, are the most likely to engage in digital 
piracy (Higgins et al., 2006; Hinduja 2001, 2003; Hollinger, 1988; Husted, 2000). College 
students have regular access to computers, are seen as less grounded in ethical standards, 
and are less controlled by vigorous rule enforcement on campuses (Hinduja, 2003). 
Additionally, college students are more likely to engage in digital piracy because they have 
insufficient financial funds to acquire the products through legitimate means. Therefore, the 
current study has sampled those individuals most likely to engage in digital piracy. 
 
 
DESIGN 
 
The present study utilized scenarios on the questionnaire to capture the certainty and 
severity of consequences following the behavior displayed in the hypothetical situation 
(Klepper & Nagin, 1989). Important to the study was the development of scenarios that 
would be believable to the targeted population. After reviewing the literature regarding the 
measures of deterrence (i.e., certainty and severity), the researchers developed the measures 
for the present study by administering a 30-item semistructured pilot study survey. This 
pilot study was given to a sample of approximately 60 college students (the target population) 
that were excluded from the study sample. With the survey, the researchers were 
attempting to discern two ideas: (1) the believability of the hypothetical scenarios and 
(2) the extralegal sanctions of performing the actions in the scenarios. Students were presented 
with 10 scenarios and were asked to rate the believability of each on an 11-point 
scale ranging from not believable to 100% believable. 
 
The most believable scenarios were chosen from the pilot study to be included in the 
administered survey. We chose to use the scenario that 95% of the respondents marked as 
believable. The scenario involving the type of digital piracy examined in this study can be 
found in the Appendix. 
 
 
MEASURES 
 
Dependent measure. To stay consistent with previous research on deterrence (Pogarsky 
& Piquero, 2004), the dependent measure in the present study was the response to a single 
item; “I would go to the web site with the intention to download the CD under these 
circumstances.” Respondents marked their level of likelihood to perform the behavior on an 
11-point scale that ranged from not likely (0) to 100% intention (10). An individual’s intention 
of performing the act was indicated by higher scores reflecting greater intentions. 
Low self-control. The present study used a 24-item composite scale from Grasmick, 
Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993) to measure low self-control. Respondents’ answers 
could range from 1= strongly disagree to 4= strongly agree. Higher scores on the scale 
indicated lower levels of self-control. 
Extra-legal sanctions. To measure extralegal sanctions consistent with the contemporary 
view of deterrence, respondents were asked questions regarding social and self-disapproval. 
Social disapproval was based on two questions (see Grasmick & Bursick, 1990; Pogarsky, 
2002). These two questions were asked in the present study: “How likely would it be that 
your family would find out that you went to the web site and downloaded the CD?” and 
“How likely would it be that your friends would find out that you went to the web site and 
downloaded the CD?” Respondents’ answers were measured on an 11-point scale ranging 
from not likely to 100% likely. Similar to Nagin and Pogarsky (2001), self-disapproval and 
its expected influence was measured by asking respondents to mark on a scale, with 1 = 
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, the degree to which they agreed with the statement, 
“I would feel guilty for going to the web site to download the CD.” Finally, the 
respondents were asked, “How morally wrong would it be if you were to go to the web site 
to download the CD?” This question was consistent with Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward 
(1992) and was measured on an 11-point scale anchored by not wrong and 100% wrong. 
 
Self-generated deterrence responses. Some researchers have contended that the use of 
hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect a person’s real-world decision-making 
process because the scenarios are artificially articulated by the researcher (Bouffard, 2002; 
Piquero & Bouffard, in press). In particular, Bouffard (2002) argues that the use of hypothetical 
scenarios may lead to the priming of the respondents’ answers and thus may create 
methodological problems. To remedy these problems, Bouffard (2002) suggests the use of 
participant-generated consequences to measure deterrence certainty and severity of a 
behavior. The present study utilized this contemporary view of deterrence theory within its 
methodology. After responding to the above extralegal sanction questions, respondents 
were presented with a table for them to develop their own measures of deterrence. 
 
For the scenario (going to the web site to download the CD), respondents were asked to 
list five “bad things” that might occur if one were to engage in the act and, then on the 
corresponding side of the table, to indicate the importance (0% to 100%) of each of the “bad 
things” when they make the decision to perform the act. The use of self-generated 
responses will better capture an individual’s true decision-making processes and better test 
deterrence theory. Additionally, Bouffard (2002) argues that the development of longer lists 
of “bad things” may indicate higher levels of self-control. Individuals with longer lists are 
viewed to have taken more time to think about the potential costs of a behavior, whereas 
those with low self-control ignore the long-term costs of the behavior, which is consistent 
with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) contention. As a result, the respondents’ self-generated 
responses will not only be used to gauge deterrence but also the individual’s level of 
self-control. 
 
One “bad thing” that respondents did list as a consequence of engaging in music piracy 
was computer viruses. Respondents that listed “virus” were coded as 1 and those that did 
not provide “virus” as a “bad thing” were coded as 0. 
 
Additional control measures. The respondents were asked their age (an open-ended 
question), sex (1 = male, 0 = female), and race (1 = White, 2 = non-White), major (1 = business 
administration, 2 = justice administration, 3 = English, 4 = mathematics, and 5 = 
other), and their family’s approximate total income in the past year (1 = $0 to $19,999, 2 = 
$20,000 to $29,999, 3 = $30,000 to $39,999, 4 = $40,000 to $49,999, and 5 = $50,000 or 
more). Consistent with Higgins et al. (2006), additional control measures were obtained by 
asking the respondents how many times in the past 2 weeks, the past month, and the past 
year they had engaged in music piracy. A scale called “previous music piracy” (1 = zero 
times, 2 = 1 to 2 times, 3 = 3 to 4 times, and 5 = more than 5 times) was created to indicate 
the frequency of involvement in the behavior. They were also asked to indicate how many 
times the individual’s male friends had participated in each of the activities during similar 
time intervals.1 Respondents marked their answers on scales ranging from zero times to 
more than 5 times. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the measures used 
for this study. The associations between guilt and intention to download (r = -.47), previous 
music piracy and intention to download (r = .40), and male friend downloading behavior and 
previous music piracy (r = .41) were significant and in their predicted directions. The association 
between moral beliefs and guilt (r = .60) was the strongest. This indicates that multicollinearity 
may be present in these data. Guilt (r = -.13) and male friend downloading 
behavior were the only measures that had significant associations with obtaining a virus from 
downloading a CD. These relationships were weak. However, the correlations show that the 
more moral beliefs increased the less likely it was for an individual to see viruses as a deterrent 
to committing music piracy. And when an individual’s male friends’ downloading behavior 
increased, that individual was more likely to view viruses as a deterrent to music piracy. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis that 
applied contemporary deterrence measures to point to strategies to reduce music piracy. 
This model allows us to examine the additive links between the independent measures and 
music piracy. Specifically, an individual’s previous music piracy (b = .15, B = .24, t = 3.86) 
had a positive link to music piracy. This indicates that individuals that have experience with 
the intentions to pirate music are likely to pirate music. Low self-control has a link with 
intentions to pirate music (b = .05, B = .13, t = 2.46). This indicates support for Gottfredson 
and Hirschi’s (1990) contention that individuals with lower levels of self-control are likely 
to engage or intend to engage in criminal and deviant behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feeling guilty about music piracy (b = -.90, B = -.31, t = -4.55) had the strongest association 
of the model with a negative relationship with music piracy. These results suggest 
that individuals are capable of feeling guilt when intending to pirate music. This is a finding 
consistent with Higgins et al. (2006). Results from the regression showed that the three 
measures accounted for 36% of the variance in music piracy. None of the demographic 
measures (i.e., sex, age, major, race, or income) were shown to have any statistically significant 
associations with music piracy. 
 
 
Multicollinearity was suggested to have been a possible problem in the bivariate correlation 
analysis. However, results from tolerance coefficients and variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) within OLS show that multicollinearity was not an issue with the measures. Field 
(2000) argued that tolerance coefficients below .20 and VIFs above 4 are problematic. The 
analyses in Table 3 show that these standards for tolerance and VIF were not met, meaning 
that multicollinearity was not an issue for this study. 
 
Table 4 presents results from multiple regression analyses that were split by an individual’s 
indication of whether a virus is a “bad thing.” This allows us to examine a possible 
interaction between the perception of getting a virus and the other independent measures 
because they may link with music piracy.2We used intention to download a CD illegally as 
the dependent variable. To probe the statistically significant coefficients across the two 
groups, we used the Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998) z-score. In the “no 
viruses” group, self-control (b = .05, B = .14, z = .00) and previous music piracy (b = .16, 
B = .25, z = -.51) were shown to have positive associations with an individual’s likelihood 
of seeing computer viruses as a potential consequence of engaging in music piracy. As an 
individual’s level of self-control decreased or his or her previous music piracy frequency 
increased, the individuals were more likely to intend to pirate music. The self-control findings 
are consistent with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory in that those with low self-control 
are likely to pirate music because they do not see viruses as a deterrent. 
 
In the context of deterrence theory in the “no virus” group, the only measure that was 
statistically significant was guilt (b = -.81, B = -.28, z = -1.01). When comparing guilt to low 
self-control and to prior music piracy, guilt has the strongest association in the entire model. 
This suggests that individuals who do not see viruses as a deterrent see guilt as a deterrent, 
and the z-score is larger than the effect of the individual propensities (i.e., self-control). 
For the “yes virus” group, “feeling guilty” (b = -1.32, B = -.45, z = -1.01) was the only 
significant measure from the model. As an individual’s level of guilt increased, the likelihood 
of him or her listing viruses as a consequence decreases. This is in contrast to the “no 
virus” model that showed individual propensities (i.e., self-control) were statistically 
significant and relevant in producing intentions to pirate music. That is, for individuals 
that listed “no virus,” the individuals’ level of self-control did not cloud their view of the 
consequences of their actions regarding music piracy. Thus, the perception of downloading 
a virus may be considered a deterrent for digital piracy.3 
 
The analysis turns to multicollinearity. As with Table 3, the tolerance and VIF are within 
their standard, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem. Thus, we interpret 
these findings as free from multicollinearity. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The findings from the present study indicate that deterrence is important in understanding 
factors for reducing instances of digital piracy (Paternoster, 1987; Yu & Liska, 1993). 
The findings suggest that guilt is an important factor in reducing instances of digital piracy 
(Higgins et al., 2006). Furthermore, the findings support previous research that low selfcontrol 
has a link with digital piracy (Higgins, 2005; Higgins et al., 2005; Higgins et al., 2006). 
The uniqueness of the present study comes in its inclusion of computer viruses as a 
selfgenerated 
deterrent for digital piracy. The use of viruses in this study was compared against 
the other deterrent measures and low self-control. The results from the main analysis do not 
show that viruses are an important deterrent factor for reducing instances of digital piracy. 
This is not in accord with the view from the IFPI (2006). 
 
The role of viruses as a deterrent was probed by splitting the sample for those that did 
say that viruses were a deterrent and those that did not say that viruses were a deterrent. 
This analysis takes into account that viruses do have an effect on the measures, but the 
effect is masked by the other measures. For those who do not see viruses as an important 
deterrent, low self-control (Higgins et al., 2006) and guilt (Higgins et al., 2006) are important 
measures. However, those that see viruses as an important deterrent also see guilt as a 
deterrent. Importantly, for these individuals, the propensities to digital piracy are not significant. 
This finding suggests that viruses are a deterrent, supporting the view from the 
IFPI. Thus, individuals who perceive that they will download a virus are less likely to digitally 
pirate. This is indicated by removing the positive effects of all other measures but 
leaving the negative effect of guilt. 
 
The findings from this study suggest avenues for reducing instances of digital piracy. For 
example, policy makers can use guilt to reduce instances of digital piracy. This may be 
accomplished by placing statements in downloading procedures that incite guilt. 
Furthermore, this preliminary study indicates that the ethical use of viruses may be important 
in reducing instances of digital piracy. That is, security administrators may be able to 
ethically attach a virus to downloadable music files or within peer-to-peer formats so that 
the viruses are attached to those files when downloaded. 
 
Although the findings of this study suggest that guilt and viruses may be important in 
reducing instances of digital piracy, the findings have limits. That is, our measurement of 
viruses is not a direct measure afforded to all individuals. Although our measurement may 
not be standardized for all individuals, this strategy is relevant because it follows the more 
contemporary method prescribed by Bouffard (2002) for gathering deterrence information. 
In addition, our split sample analysis may be biased because of the small sample size. 
However, we performed a simulation analysis that illustrates very little bias and proper 
power levels for the analysis. Furthermore, the analysis only comes from one college. 
Additional studies in this area that use larger sample sizes are warranted to further understand 
this connection. 
 
Despite the limits of the present study, deterrence is an important perspective in understanding 
the measures that can be used to reduce instances of digital piracy. Studies that 
address the standardization of the measurement, the small sample size, and the generalizability 
of the findings would be important in our understanding of reducing digital piracy. 
Our findings indicate that guilt and viruses may be used to reduce instances of digital piracy. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Scenario 1 
 
A popular CD has just been released to music stores nationwide. All of your friends have heard 
the CD and told you that it is great and that you have to get it! Unfortunately, every time that you 
try to go to get the CD, you cannot because it is always sold out. However, a friend tells you 
about an underground online web site that has posted an underground copy of the entire CD. 
The site will only allow visitors to download the CD before the visitors can listen to it. You really 
want the CD. 
NOTES 
 
1. Substantively, the results are the same with or without the inclusion of female friends’ 
downloading behavior. The study only uses male friends’ downloading behavior in the analysis 
for this reason. 
2. Furthermore, following the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we performed a mean 
difference analysis that showed “Get Virus” did have a significant effect on the intentions to 
perform digital piracy. Therefore, we are able to conclude that getting a virus had a mean effect 
on intentions to perform digital piracy. 
3. We performed a regression analysis that took into account the interaction between feeling 
guilty and getting a virus, previous music piracy and getting a virus, and self-control and getting 
a virus. Our results were substantively the same as in the split regression analysis. We would 
like to thank the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion because of concerns about statistical 
power. 
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